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CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN: 
HOW THE AIRLINES AND THE FEDEhOAL A VIA TION 
ADMINISTRATIONARE ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
Roger C. Matteson 
ABSTRACT 
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) is not a new problem. It has been around since the beginning of manned flight. 
A CFIT accident occurs when an airworthy aircraft, under the control of a pilot, is flown (unintentionally) into terrain, 
water, or obstacles with inadequate awareness on the part of the pilot (crew) of the impending collision (Wiener, 1977). 
It would seem that CFIT would be an easy problem to solve or reduce but unfortunately, that has not been the case. 
CFIT is still the leading cause of all fatal aircraft accidents in the world. Figure 1 illustrates the CFIT accident rate 
compared to other types of fatal airline accidents. It can be noted that CFIT is not the leading cause of the U.S. fatal 
accident rate however, the world wide CFIT rate is still a major concern. This paper will address the issues as they 
pertain to CFIT, to include the causes, prevention and the future aspects in dealing with CFIT. 
Although the reduction of the CFlT accident rate has 
been reduced over the years, there still is more that can be 
done. The "Swiss Cheese" model of accident causation 
illustrates that for an accident to occur, hilures have to 
occur at several levels ofresponsibility(Reason, 1990). The 
model illustrates the following: 
1. Organizational Factors 
- excessive cost cutting 
- reduction in flight hours 
2. Unsafe Supervision 
- deficient training program 
- improper crew pairing 
3. Preconditions for Unsafe Ads 
- loss of situational awareness 
- poor CRM 
4. Unsafe Acts 
- failed to scan instruments 
- penetrated IMC when VMC only 
5. Accident and Injury 
- crashed into side of mountain (Reason, 
1990) 
The aircraft that pilot's fly today are the safest and most 
complex in history. So why are we still having problems 
with CFIT? The answer is as complex as the aircraft. As 
pilots, we do not l i e  to admit that pilot error could be a 
contributing factor. If we cannot identify or r e h e  to 
recognize the source ofthe problem, then we cannot begin 
to find a solution. Pilots must be willing to admit that they 
are the weak link in the chain and approach this problem 
in an aggressive manner. With the introduction of 
advanced avionics, the aviation in* has seen the CFIT 
accident rate go down. Initial and recurrent training will 
also be a key factor when approaching the problem. 
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Worldwide and U.S. Airline Number of Fatal Accidents 
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Figure 1 (NTSB, 1999) 
Probable Causes of CFIT Accidents 
To be able to find a solution, we have to look at some 
specific accidents that the primary cause was CFIT. By 
reviewing these accidents, wecan compile information that 
was derived kom the accident investigation and begin to 
recognize some common causal factors. One of the more 
recent accidents involved an American Aiilies B-757 near 
Cali, Columbia on December 20, 1995. Although several 
factors led to the accident, situational awareness of the 
cockpit crew seemed to very low, which led to the impact 
with a mountain peak. According to Dr. Mica Endsley fiom 
theUniversityofSouthern California, situationalawareness 
can be defined as 'The perception of elements in the 
environment, the comprehension oftheir meaningandtheir 
projection into the near future" (Mancuso, 1995). In other 
words, the crew did not lmow their location at a critical 
time of flight. 
It should be noted that the Cali accident was not 
investigated by the National Traffic Safety Board (NTSB) 
but by Columbia's Aeronautics Civil which is the 
Columbian equivalent of our Federal Aviation 
Admimistration (FAA) (Garrison, 1997). In the accident, 
the crew reportedly entered the wrong data into the flight 
management computer (FMC) and commanded the aircraft 
to go the Romeo Non Directional Beacon (NDB) versus the 
RozoNDB pornhein, 1996). Rozo was the correct NDB to 
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use for the approach into Cali. The flight crew failed to 
recognize that the new data entered into the FMC would 
take them off course. American Airlines proposed that the 
flight crew's Mure  to perceive the FMC-initiated turn 
away Eom the intendedrouting, was one probable cause for 
the accident (Dornhein, 1996). From that moment on, they 
were not fully aware of their location. 
Other probable causes that were brought out in the 
investigation are: 
I. Design of the FMS to include displays, 
database, and lack of terrain displayed. 
2. The psychological relationship of pilots to 
onboard automation. 
3. System wamings with 111 power when 
spdbrakes are deployed 
4. Lack of angle of attack information in the 
cockpit for pilots to be able to achieve maximum- 
performance climbs. 
5. Ambiguous naming (Columbia government) of 
navigation aids. 
6. Linguistic barriers between pilots and 
controllers (Garrison, 1997). 
On January 13, 1998, a Learjet 258 crashed 
approximately two miles short of the George Bush 
Intercontinental Airport in Houston, Texas. In this case, the 
aircrew was conducting an approach into the airport using 
an Instrument Landing System WS). The captain started 
the approach but transferred control to the &st officer 
shmly after passing the final approach fix (FAF). 
Although the ILS indicator in the cockpit showed that the 
aircraft was on the localizer, the glideslope showed that the 
aircraR was well above glidepath. The captain elected to 
continue the appmach by telling the first officer to increase 
rate of descent to "catch" the glideslope @atq 1999). The 
mew continued below the decision height and impacted the 
ground. All data retrieved from the accident indicated that 
the aircraft was actually below glidepath. An error was 
detected in the glidepath indicator during the accident 
investigation. 
The NTSB determined that several incidents occurred 
that led up to the Leajet going below the glidepath and 
colliding with the ground: 
1. The crew did not perform an approach briefing 
that was required by the flight crew's company. 
2. Thecaptain's decision to cuntinuetheapproacb 
by transferring control to the first offim after passing the 
FAF. 
Controlled Fli~ht Into Terrain 
3. The captain's decision to continue the approach 
while the glideslope indicator was showing well above 
glidepath. 
4. Theairplane'scorporateoperatortoproperly fix 
theglideslope indicator, that hadbeen reportednot properly 
indicating correct glidepath information on a previous 
flight (Katz, 1999). 
It was also noted that if a Ground Proximity Warning 
System (GPWS) was installed, it may havegiven the pilots 
adequate warning before impact with the terrain. Although 
this may have helped to prevent this accident, a GPWS was 
not required for this type of aircraft or operation. 
An accident involving a Korean Aii B-747 happened on 
August 6, 1997 in Guam. The aircrew was flying a 
loml i -on ly  approach, when the aircraft impacted the 
ground about three miles short of the Guam International 
Airport (McKema, 1997). The aircraft was flying at night 
in heavy rain and clouds. The NTSB determined the 
probable cause ofthe accident was the captain's failure to 
adequately brief and execute the nonprecision approach 
(NEB, 2000). Other possiblemtributing factorsthat may 
have led to the accident are: 
1. The first officer and flight engineer failed to 
effectively monitor and cross check the captain's execution 
of the approach. 
2. The captain's fatigue due to a recent trip 
returning fiom Hong Kong on August 4th. 
3. Koreans Air's inadequate flight mew training. 
4. The FAA's intentional inhibition of the 
minimum safe altitude warning WSAW) system at Guam. 
An interesting side note about the Korean Air accident is 
apparently the low altitude alarms aboard the plane were 
operating properly, but the pilots largely ignored them 
(Jackson, 1998). 
An accident involving a Express 11 Jetstream BA3100, 
occmed while on a localizer back course in Hibbiig, 
M i e s o t a  on December 1,1993. According to the NTSB, 
a breakdown in crew coordination was the probable cause 
of the accident (Air Safety Center, 1999). This led to loss 
of altitude a m m e s s  by the flight crew dwing an 
unstabilized approach at night and impacting the ground 
short of the runway. According to the accident report, 
contributing to the accident was: 
1. Failure of the company management to 
adequately address the previous identified deficiencies in 
airmanship and crew resource management (CRM). 
2. The failure of the company to identify and 
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correct a widespread, unapproved practice during 
instrument approach procedures. 
3. TheFAA inadequatesurveillanceandoversight 
of the air carrier (Air Safety Center, 1999). 
Although the above examples are not the only 
factors that contribute to CFIT type accidents, they can help 
to formulate some common causes. All four involved some 
type of degradation of crew communication which resulted 
fiom a low situational awareness in the cockpit. In the 
American Airlines accident, wrong data was entered in the 
FMS and neither aircrew backed up the data. The Learjet 
aircrew failed to conduct an approach briefing prior to 
executing the approach. The Korean Aim crew failed to 
monitor the captain's execution of the approach and the 
action's of the Express I1 captain led to the breakdown in 
crew coordination. 
The next common factor in these accidents is lack of 
advanced avionics or the proper use of the systems that are 
on board the aircrafl. The Cali accident involved systems 
that failed to warn the pilots of rapidly increasing terrain, 
speedbrakes deployed or maximum pfonnance climb 
information. Also, the accident prompted the FAA to 
recommend a new system to be installed called the 
Enhanced GPWS FGPWS). Information about this system 
will be addressed later in this paper. The Leajet259 crash 
involved using an inoperative glideslope indicator. In the 
Korean Aii disaster, the Aii Traffic Control (ATC) system, 
MSAW, was not working. If the MSAW system was 
operating, the air traffic controller could have advised the 
aircrew of possible ground impact. Also, this ose brings 
out the fact that the low altitude warning a l m s  were 
working in the cockpit, but the aircrew ii led to take any 
actions. Finally, in the Express 11 incident, the loss of 
altitude awareness was due to possible actions of the 
captain to limit time in severe icing conditions (Aii Safety 
Center ,, 1999). The findings by the NTSB also found that 
if a GPWS system was installed, it may have given the 
pilots enough warning to avoid collision with the ground. 
Training Airerew in CFIT Prevention 
According to Daniel Maurino, the coordiinator of the 
ICAO flight safety and human factors program, the 
introduction of advanced systems on a large scale, may 
have produced two flaws: 
1. It was technology-driven rather than human- 
centered. 
2. It stopped short of the micro-level of system 
design analysis (Maurino, 1993). 
Page 16 
Maurino's analysis of the problem seems to indicate that 
with the development of advanced systems, the human 
element was not taken entirely into consideration. 
In 1992, the Flight Safety Foundation @SF) and the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
organized a CFIT Task Force. The task force set as a five 
year goal a fifty percent reduction in CFIT accidents (Flight 
Safety Foundation, 1999). According to the FSF, the task 
forceachieved that goal in 1996 and 1997 by concentrating 
on four areas: 
1. Distributed a Safety Alert to thousands of 
operators on the use of GPWS. 
2. Developed a CFIT checklist. 
3. Created a video training tape titled "CFIT: 
Awareness and Prevention." 
4. Produced a CFIT Education and Training Aid 
(Flight Safety Foundation, 1999). 
The emphasis of these four areas deals with the pilot's 
interaction with avionics and with each other. The goal of 
each was to increase the pilot's awareness of possible CFIT 
scenarios and to avoid the possibility of an accident. Each 
were developed out of actual CFIT accidents to inaease 
pilot awareness and how to react in similar situations. 
The FAA's Safer Skies Initiative was established in 
April, 1998 with the goal of reducing b l  commercial 
aviation accidents 80% by the year 2007 (Air Safety Center 
, 1999). Some of the recommendations by the FAA 
include: 
I. Adopting standard operating procedures which 
deal with prevention of CFIT. 
2. Revise training programs which would 
incorporate CFIT training into CRM programs. 
3. Training air traffic controllers in CFIT 
prevention and the MSAW system (Air Safety Center ,, 
1999). 
With the development of CFIT prevention into the CRM 
programs commercial operators can incorporate CFIT 
training into their initial and recurrent CRM training. It 
has already been established by the airline industry that 
CRM has helped aircrew to inaease sihlational awareness. 
With the addition of CFIT Waining, CRM will be able to 
incorporate a high degree of awareness of possible 
scenarios that can lead up to these types of accidents. 
After the crash of the Korean Air 9-747 in Guam, the 
airline's chief of flight crew operations, testified to the 
NTSB that CRM training had been revised since the 
accident. Captain Lee Jung Taek stated in his testimony 
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AIR TRANSPORT CFIT ACCIDENTS 
Figure 2 (FAA, 1997) Part 121 & 125 CFIT Accidents 1969 - 1980 
USA Part 121& 125 
that co-pilots are now trained to repeat advice about 
abnormal or dangerous conditions to the captain 
(McKenna, 1998). One interesting note that was not 
brought up in this investigatioh is the fact of cultural 
differences. In some Asian cultures, it is unacceptable for 
an underling to question a supemisor. This could impede 
two way communication in the cockpit. 
Current and Future Avionics Used to Prevent ClTT 
W& these new training programs beiig implemented in 
the commercial carriers, the other area that needs to be 
looked at is avionics. One of the major causes in the 
reduction of CFIT was the introduction of GPWS in the 
mid 1970's. As the figure 2 indicates, the CFIT accident 
rate has significantly declined since GPWS was introduced 
but it did not eliminate it. As has been pointed out in this 
paper, three reasons that may have attributed to that are; 
1. Not properly training airaew to include CRM 
training with use of GPWS. 
2. Limitations in the system that will not give 
warnings in critical areas of flight. 
3. Aircrew ignoring the low altitude warning 
indications. 
Along with training aircrew in therecognitionand 
avoidance of CFIT scenarios, the aviation industry has 
developed several types of avionics to aid the aircrew in 
CFIT accident reduction. Although GPWS had gone 
through major upgrades and changes over the years, there 
are still certain flight regimes that GPWS is ineffective in 
giving adequate warning. It can only provide information 
to the pilots on the terrain directly below the aircraft, 
utilizimg a radar altimeter. If the terrain directly in eont of 
the air& increases rapidly, the GPWS may not be able to 
detect the increase in time to give the pilot adequate 
warning to react. One of the findings in the American 
Airlines accident in Cali, Colombia, was that the aircraft 
did have a functioning GPWS, hut it was not effective due 
to the rapid inneasing terrain @wnheh 1996). 
The EGPWS system had been out for several months 
prior to the December, 1995 accident in Cali. It was this 
accident that prompted the FAA to encourage the airlines 
to put the system in all of their aircraft (Evans, 2000). 
What makes the EGPWS different !?om older versions, is 
it has a memory database and a forward looking display 
that tells pilots what the actual terrain is like ahead of the 
aircraft. GPWS versions use the terrain change directly 
below the airmail to wam the pilots. If the terrain was to 
increase rapidly, GPWS may not give the pilots adequate 
warning to avoid contact with the ground. EGPWS along 
with a Global Positioning System (GPS), relies on a 
worldwide database ofthe terrain that is loaded in the FMS 
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and periodically updated. Pilots can see the terrain that is 
in eont of the airaaft through an existing weather radar 
display, Electronic Flight Instrument System display or 
some other Multi Functional Display (MFD) in the cockpit 
(Allidsignal, 1996). 
A slightly different version of GPWS is called Auto- 
Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS) that has 
been developed by the military. Auto-GCAS is a last 
defense system that overrides the pilot's controls to 
automatically execute a climb or turning recovery (Scott, 
1996). The system assumes that the pilot is unaware of the 
circumstance and takes over the controls momentarily. 
Auto-GCAS uses a terrain database as well as a radar 
altimeter to predict theupcoming terrain. When the system 
predicts a possible collision with the ground, it 
automatically executes the escape maneuver. If the any 
components ofthe system fails, the Auto-GCAS commands 
the airaaft to climb. The system was succffshlly tested on 
U.S. Air Force F-16 aircraft, but can be adapted to any 
aircraft with varying escape profiles. (Scotf 1996) 
Another unique sysrern that is being tested is the 
Transponder Landing System (TLS). The TLS utilizes the 
aircraft transponder and the Air Traffic Control Radar 
Beacon System (ATCRBS) on the ground to give the pilot 
position and attitude information (Pimu, 1999). The TLS 
will provide the pilot with the same display as an ILS 
would The TLS also has the ability to adjust the beam so 
it would not be a bed signal as in the ILS, and would have 
the ability to guide aircraft for landing out to 22 nautical 
miles (Picou, 1999). 
Although the EGPWS is the most advanced and an 
improvement over the standard GPWS system, there are 
still some inherent flaws in the system. The Allied Pilots 
Association is lobbying for a system that gives pilots a four 
dimensional view of the upcoming terrain (Goyer, 1998). 
The EGPWS currently displays only a three dimensional 
view or a bid's eye display using color codes to depict 
terrain height in relation to the aircraft's current altitude. 
The four dimensional system would also give the pilots a 
graphical representation of approaching terrain, as well as 
flight path projections (Goyer, 1998). 
Aii traffic controllers also have the ability to help prevent 
CFIT. IfATC systems are working correctly and controllers 
are able to interpret the information, such accidents could 
be prevented The MSAW system was created for just that 
reason. There are two main reasons that thesystem has not 
prevented such high profile accidents such as the American 
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Airlines in Cali, Columbia and the Korean Aii in Guam. 
First, the system has to be installed. Currently, only the U. 
S., Japan and Israel have the system (Phillips, 1999). The 
second reason is the system has to be working conectly. 
The MSAW system was installed, but not covering the area 
when the crash occurred in the Korean Air disaster in 
Guam. 
Another interesting statistic suggests that execution of 
non-precision approaches increase the rate of CFIT 
accidents. A shldy by the Approach and Landing Accident 
Reduction Task Force (ALAR) found that 50% of the CFIT 
accidents occurred during the approach and landing phase 
of the flight and 75% of those occurred at airports that did 
not have precision approach navigation aids. The ALAR 
Task Force was formed by the Flight Safety Foundation and 
studied 156 CFIT accidents i?om 1988-1994 (Phillips, 
1999). The study goes to suggest that replacing non- 
precision approach systemswithprecisionapproaches, may 
reduce the CFIT accident rate. 
Concerns and Potential Problems 
One concern that has been mentioned is the integration 
of the advanowl avionics and the human machine. 
Although systems aboard the airaaft are designed to help 
the pilot avoid CFIT scenarios, if the airaew is not 
sensitized and trained to use and interpret the avionics 
correctly, it literally makes the equipment useless. The 
investigation in Guam of the Korean Aii B747, indicated 
that the altitude alert systems aboard the airaaft were 
working correctly, but the aircrew chose to ignore the 
appropriate warnings and continue the descent and 
impactedtheground. Improper training and lack ofaircrew 
coordination contributed to this accident and has been a 
major factor in many more. 
Another example ofthis involved a Southwest Airlines B- 
737 performing a hard landing at the Burbank-Glendale- 
Pasadena Airport on March 5,2000. The aircral? skidded 
off the runway and slightly injured fifteen people. 
Preliminary investigations indicated that the aircraft was 
flying an unstable approach. An unstable approach is one 
in which an airaafl; 
1. is not aligned with the runway at a sufficient 
height, 
2. is not descending at a steady rate, 
3. hils to capture the glideslope or correct vertical 
profile, 
4. does not attain the desired speed, or 
5. does not establish the desired configuration 
6




Further investigation of the Southwest Airlines accident 
indicated the aircraft had a steeper than normal glidepath 
of up to six degrees caused by a late descent past the FAF 
(Phillips, 2000). The "'sink rate, pull up" voice warning 
alarm lkomthe GPWS system soundedseveraltimes during 
theapproach and the aircraft approach speed was almost 60 
MPH faster than the normal approah speed (Phillips, 
2000). This recent accident illustrates the problem that is 
still present with avionics and crew integration. 
General Aviation (GA) and corporate aircraft are not 
required to have such systems aboard their airaaft. Since 
those type of aircrafl do most of the flying in the U.S., 
CFIT is a major concern for them. Although studies for the 
CFIT accident rate for GA and corporate airaafi are not 
noted in this paper, we can assume that it is a problem. So 
why not install these warning devices in the aircraft? Cost 
is the prohibiting factor for putting a system like GPWS in 
these aircrqft. 
Regional carriers also have concerns about more 
advanced systems. The indusmhas spentmillions in recent 
years installing the GPWS in their fleet ofaircraft. Now the 
FAA i s  threatening to have all commercial aircraft install 
the EGPWS in their aircraft by year 2001 
(CommerciaVRegional Airline News, 1998). Currently, 
U.S. major airlines are under a voluntary program to install 
EGPWS by 2003. The Regional Airline Association is 
lobbying for a volunteer program similar to the majors for 
installing the EGPWS by 2003. Estimatedcost of installing 
Controlled F&ht Into Terrain 
have EGPWS by 2001. According to Stuart Matthews, 
president of the Flight Safety Foundation, it would take 
twenty years before it's installed in every commercial 
aircraft in the U.S. (Marks, 1998). 
Conclusion 
The first part in finding a solution to CFIT accident 
prevention seems to be a comprehensive plan of proper 
aircrew training in the following: 
1. The use and coordination of avionics systems 
that help prevent CFIT accidents. 
2. Integrating CFIT scenarios into CRM in the 
initial and recurrent training of aircrew. 
3. Encourage open communication between flight 
crew where pilots check each other in critical phases of 
flight such as approach and landing. 
4. Perform approach briefings to increase 
situational awareness in the cockpit. 
The second part of the solution deals with aircraft 
systems in the aircraft. The proper use of altitude warning 
systems is the key to accident prevention. Plans are being 
developed for new systems, however, the FAA should take 
into amunt the time and cost to efllectively integrate these 
systems into the airline industry. Estimated total cost for 
upgrades to the EGPWS system for the regional airline 
industry would be in excess of $115 million 
(CommerciaVRegional Airline News, 1998). This could 
adversely impact the smaller airlines significantly. It is 
unrealistic to assume that ifa new system is developed (like 
the EGPWS), that it will immediately be put into use. By 
the EGPWS system would be $23,900 for an aircraft that utilizing the proper integration of aircrew training and 
already has the GPWS installed and $40,000 for a complete current altitude avoidance systems, the CFIT reduction rate 
system that would include a display in the coEkpit can be reduced. New and improved systems should 
(CommerciaVRegional Airline News, 1998). The time line continue to be developed and installed, but at a reasonable 
set forth by the FAA may be unreasonable. As indicated pace that will not impede the growth of the airline 
above, if the FAA gets its way, all commercial airaaft will industry.0 
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has earned Master CFI designation f?om the National Association of Flight Instructors. 
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